Stable marriage problem

Results: 84



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41Mechanism design / Stable marriage problem / Monash University / Optimal design / Pareto efficiency / Preference / Statistics / Game theory / Economics

The Department of Economics at Monash University invites you to attend a one-day conference on MARKET DESIGN Friday 19th December 2014 TO REGISTER please RSVP by

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Source URL: www.buseco.monash.edu.au

Language: English - Date: 2014-12-08 18:36:18
42Core / Cooperative game / Shapley value / Stable marriage problem / Lloyd Shapley / Transferable utility / Nash equilibrium / David Gale / Edgeworth conjecture / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

1 5 OCTOBE R[removed]Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2012 S TA B L E A L L O C AT I O N S A N D THE PRACTICE OF MARKET DESIGN

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Source URL: www.nobelprize.org

Language: English - Date: 2013-10-18 06:47:13
43Economics / Guggenheim Fellows / Game theory / Cooperative games / Lloyd Shapley / Alvin E. Roth / Stable marriage problem / Fellows of the Econometric Society / Science / Mathematics

PRESSMEDDELANDE Press release 15 O ctober 2012

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Source URL: www.nobelprize.org

Language: English - Date: 2013-10-18 06:47:17
44Mathematics / Consumer theory / Fellows of the Econometric Society / Matching / Stable marriage problem / David Gale / Two-sided market / Preference / Core / Game theory / Economics / Cooperative games

The Theory and Practice of Market Design

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Source URL: www.nobelprize.org

Language: English - Date: 2013-10-18 06:47:21
45Economics / Mathematics / Structure / Partnerships / Stable marriage problem / Alternative medicine / Matching / Public goods game / Nash equilibrium / Game theory / Business law / Types of business entity

The University of Adelaide School of Economics Research Paper No[removed]April 2011

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Source URL: economics.adelaide.edu.au

Language: English - Date: 2014-08-10 21:21:47
46National Resident Matching Program / Mathematics / Matching / Stable marriage problem

Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition Itai Ashlagi Yash Kanoria

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Source URL: www.columbia.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-07-31 11:15:22
47Residency / Mathematics / Medicine / Health / Medical education in the United States / National Resident Matching Program / Stable marriage problem

IMPROVING EFFICIENCY IN MATCHING MARKETS WITH REGIONAL CAPS: THE CASE OF THE JAPAN RESIDENCY MATCHING PROGRAM YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA Department of Economics, Harvard University

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Source URL: federation.ens.fr

Language: English - Date: 2012-09-26 07:59:49
48Game theory / Stable marriage problem / Gender studies / Behavior / Gender role / Gender / Mathematics / Matching / Cooperative games

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst[removed]:183–199 DOI[removed]s10458[removed]x Manipulation complexity and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures Maria Silvia Pini · Francesca Rossi ·

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Source URL: www.cse.unsw.edu.au

Language: English - Date: 2011-06-15 22:35:28
49Game theory / Matching / Stable marriage problem / NP / Summation / Mathematics / Theoretical computer science / Cooperative games

CS 330 – Spring 2013, Assignment 1 Problems due at the beginning of class on Thursday January 31. Our first homework has several questions that require short proofs. In writing up proofs, try to make sure your reasonin

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Source URL: www.cs.bu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2013-01-16 17:15:01
50Education in the United States / Medicine / Stable marriage problem / Residency / Alvin E. Roth / Matching / National Matching Service / Medical school / Dating / Medical education in the United States / Mathematics / National Resident Matching Program

Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets Fuhito Kojima Parag A. Pathak

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Source URL: kuznets.fas.harvard.edu

Language: English - Date: 2010-05-18 12:02:31
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